The Pentagon and the "long war"

Back in February, the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review of 2005 spoke of a long war:

The document, known by its acronym, QDR, opens with the words: "The US is engaged in what will be a long war."

It's not of their choosing. Al Qaida strategists beat them to it. According to this analysis by Michael Scheuer:

Al-Qaeda believes that it and its allies can only defeat the United States in a "long war", one that allows the Islamists to capitalize on their extraordinary patience, as well as on their enemies' lack thereof. Before his death in a firefight with Saudi security forces, the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Abu Hajar Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, wrote extensively about how al-Qaeda believed the military fight against the US and its allies would unfold. He envisioned a point at which the mujahideen would have to develop semi-conventional forces. He identified this period as the "Decisive Stage" [1].

The piece cited is dated February 2, 2004, approximately two years before the release of the latest QDR.

Al-Muqrin's ideas were hardly original on this point. Mao penned similar thoughts decades earlier.

Mao is considered to be the primary influence in guerrilla warfare. He recognizes the importance of the people in the success of the war. Well organized guerrilla units are encouraged by him to take the initiative, applying hit-and-run tactics, fighting in the enemy rear and establishing bases for popular support and for spreading their influence. He warned that guerrilla warfare is protracted and becomes conventional only as it approaches success.