On July 16, the Washington Times expressed surprise at China's new Yuan-class attack submarine.
China's naval buildup has produced a new type of attack submarine that U.S. intelligence did not know was under construction, according to U.S. defense and intelligence officials.
I find that a difficult claim to believe. Perhaps they should subscribe to Stratfor. This apparent mirror of an April 4, 2001 sample is illuminating. From the summary:
A series of incidents – stretching back several years and culminating in the apparent loss of the EP-3E aircraft – indicates that the United States has been hunting for signs of a breakthrough in Chinese submarine technology. Sources inside China and a series of incidents stretching back months and years indicate that Western militaries have been intensively hunting for clues to two new classes of submarines. One is a quiet, diesel design. The other is a potential breakthrough: a homegrown version of the Russian Victor III that would allow Beijing’s navy for the first time to threaten America’s most powerful conventional weapon, the aircraft carrier.
The inference from the piece is that the USA has been looking for evidence of new homegrown subs since at least 1999. Since such developments were anticipated, can it really be a surprise?
It's public knowledge which shipyard built the sub.
China’s Wuhan Shipyard has recently (May 2004?) launched a new generation conventional diesel-electric submarine (SSK), which is named Yuan class by the U.S. intelligence. It is estimated that the programme might have begun in 2002, with first boat laid down at Wuhan Shipyard in later 2003 or early 2004. Photos of this submarine were first seen on Internet in July 2004...
Also note that two Russian Kilo class submarines were taken out of service in 2000. The suggestion was that they were sent for repairs because of battery issues; whatever the reasons, they were likely taken offline for reverse engineering as well.
Nor is the USA unaware of the emerging threat. Back in May 2001, this report noted that Rumsfeld contemplated cutting existing aircraft carriers in favor of smaller carriers which would be harder to target.
In the mid-1990s, Chinese planners concluded that future strategy would be geared towards submarines.
A group of PLAN strategists summarized their analysis of the mid-1990s revolution in military affairs (RMA) as follows: “We can conclude that during the First World War, the dominant vessel was the battleship, and in World War Two, it was the aircraft carrier. In future global wars, the most powerful weapon will be the submarine… [because] submarines will experience less impact from reconnaissance technology than other platforms.” Current developments suggest that this view reflects the dominant thinking of the PLA high command.
Motive, means, and opportunity. So where exactly is the surprise here?
